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Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) have replaced quotas at the end of the Uruguay Round. We 
analyze TRQs when a foreign firm competes against a domestic firm in the latter’s 
market. Our benchmark is the strategic rent-shifting tariff. We show that the domestic 
price–equivalent TRQ is a better instrument welfare-wise, as it can extract all of the 
rents from the foreign firm. We show that different pairs of within-quota tariff and 
quota can support full rent extraction. The implication is that reduction of the former 
and enlargement of the latter, holding the above-quota tariff constant, may have no 
liberalizing effects. The first-best TRQ and the strategic tariff generate different prices. 
When firms have identical and constant marginal cost, the first-best TRQ entails 
selling a subsidy to the foreign firm and forcing the exit of the domestic firm.  
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Introduction 
he purpose of this article is to illustrate how the different instruments of tariff-
rate quotas (TRQs) can be used strategically to extract rents. This topic is 
particularly relevant given the ongoing WTO negotiations on market access and the 
increased concentration in agri-food supply chains. Long regarded as examples of 
perfectly competitive markets, agricultural markets are increasingly concentrated at 
the farm input supply, food processing and food retail levels. Even bulk commodities, 
such as wheat and corn produced by thousands of farmers, are being traded by a few 
large multinationals and state trading firms that can exercise some degree of market 
power. 
The analysis of trade policy under imperfect competition has shown that 
governments can extract rents from a foreign monopolist (e.g., Katrak, 1979) or can 
manipulate rivalries between domestic and foreign firms to increase the profits of the 
domestic “champions” (Brander and Spencer, 1983). Several papers have identified 
practical difficulties in implementing strategic policies by pointing out that 
governments may not always have enough information about the costs of domestic 
and foreign firms (e.g., Brainard and Martimort, 1997; Creane and Miyagiwa, 2008) 
or about the nature of the rivalries between firms (e.g., Maggi, 1996). TRQs were 
introduced in 1994 as instruments to manage market access for sensitive products 
because the tariffication of non-tariff barriers had prompted some countries to propose 
tariffs that would have reduced historical levels of market access. TRQs allow 
countries to tax a certain volume of imports (i.e., the quota) at a within-quota rate and 
additional imports at a different rate. Little has been written about how they should be 
set, except in rather specific contexts (e.g., Larue, Gervais and Pouliot, 2007). Table 1 
shows some examples of TRQs. The over-quota tariffs that apply to imports in excess 
of the quota are high (29 percent) or extremely high (887 percent), while the within-
quota tariffs range from a low of 5.4 percent to a high of 399 percent. Interestingly, 
the relative height of the within-quota and above-quota tariffs varies. Gibson et al. 
(2001) report country averages and find average within-quota and above-quota tariffs 
of 262 percent and 203 percent, respectively, for Norway, 3 percent and 139 percent 
for Canada and 10 percent and 52 percent for the United States, which also suggests 
that there are different patterns in setting TRQs. It is evident that not all countries are 
willing to give up rents, whether there is scope for strategic policies or not. Our note 
hopes to fill this gap in the literature by showing that TRQs can be much more potent 
rent-shifting devices than are tariffs. 
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Table 1  Examples of TRQs Imposed by Various Countries 
Country TRQ code Product Bound within-quota tariff 
Bound above-
quota tariff 
Brazil Bra001 Apples and 
pears 
13.5 28.8
Canada Can002b Poultry 5.4 238 
Canada Can005a Milk and cream 7.5 241 
Korea Kor024 Manioc 20 887 
Korea Kor031 Citrus fruits 50 144 
Norway Nor024 Milk and cream 399 339 
Norway Nor196 Other 
vegetables 
38 606 
Norway Nor048 Lettuce, 
cabbage 
166 74
 
The TRQ as a Device to Sell  Domestic Market Access 
n our benchmark case, the government relies on a specific tariff to affect the 
behaviour of a domestic firm and a foreign firm (also referred to as firms 1 and 2) 
which have constant and equal marginal costs (normalized at zero for simplicity). The 
demand is 1 2p A q q= − − . The firms have Cournot conjectures, and the free trade 
equilibrium quantities in this case are simply 1 2 / 3
ft ftq q A= = . The free trade 
equilibrium price is / 3ftp A= , and both firms make the same profit 
2
1 2 / 9
ft ft Aπ π= = . The importing country’s welfare is defined as the sum of 
consumer surplus and firm 1’s profit. Given our demand and cost specification, 
welfare under free trade is 2 / 3ftW A= . 
It is well known from the strategic trade policy literature that a tariff can raise the 
importing country’s welfare (Brander, 1995). Ignoring the possibility of retaliation in 
response to the tariff,1 the importing country maximizes the same welfare function as 
above except for the addition of tariff revenue. The imposition of a specific tariff t 
introduces an asymmetry in the profit-maximizing quantities offered by domestic and 
foreign firms: 
    (1) 
 
  
I 
( ) ( )* *1 2 2,3 3
A t A tq t q t+ −= =  
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Because these quantities are strategic substitutes, and given that the stability 
conditions on the slope of the firms’ reaction functions are respected, the domestic 
(foreign) firm ends up producing more (less) at a higher price than under free trade. 
Accordingly, the profit of the domestic (foreign) firm is higher (lower) than under free 
trade for 0t > : 
   (2) 
 
The importing country’s welfare boils down to a simple expression quadratic in the 
tariff: ( ) 2 20.5
3 3
A AtW t t= + − . The maximization of this expression gives us the 
best rent-shifting tariff: * / 3t A= . Replacing t by *t  in ( )W t , we can show that this 
tax on imports raises domestic welfare: 
    (3) 
 
Even though consumer surplus falls, welfare increases relative to free trade because of 
the increase in the profit of the domestic firm from 29 / 81A  under free trade to 
216 / 81A  under the rent-shifting tariff. However, the rent-shifting is partial as the 
foreign firm still make a profit in equilibrium: ( )* 22 / 81t Aπ = . Thus, a deviation 
from free trade can be justified in this context,2 and this is why the strategic tariff is a 
logical benchmark for our TRQ analysis. 
Let us now suppose that a tariff-rate quota is imposed on the foreign firm instead 
of a specific tariff. The TRQ is parameterized as { }2, ,w aT t q t≡% , with wt  being the 
within-quota tariff, at  the above-quota tariff and 2q  the quota. As long as the foreign 
firm’s exports are within the quota, 2 2(0, ]q q∈ , the only tariff applied is wt . If 
exports exceed the quota, 2 2q q> , then the tariff wt  is imposed on the first 2q  units 
and the tariff at  is imposed on all additional units exported by firm 2. Let ( )2q T%%  be 
the foreign firm’s profit-maximizing output; the firm’s profit can be written as: 
(4) 
 
 
( ) 2 2* 3.5 39 9 ftA AW t W= > =  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 2
2
,
9 9
A t A t
t tπ π+ −= =  
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
, if
, if
, if
w
w
w a
A q q T t q T q T q
T A q q t q q T q
A q q T q T t q t q T q q T q
π
 − − − <= − − − = − − − − − >
% % %% % %
% %%
% % % %% % % %
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When ( )2 2q T q>%% , it is convenient to rewrite the profit of the foreign firm as: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 2 2 2w a aT A q q T q T t t q t q Tπ = − − − − −% % % %% % % . 
Lemma 1: A) If the TRQ is such that the foreign firm’s profit-maximizing output level, ( )2 2[0, )q T q∈%% , then the TRQ has the same effect as a specific tariff of wt , and thus 
( ) ( ) ( )*wW T W t W t= ≤% , and the TRQ is weakly inferior. B) When ( )2 2q T q=%% , and 
the foreign firm would like to export more under the within-quota tariff (and thus 
( ) ( )* *2 2 2w aq t q q t> > ), the TRQ is equivalent to a quota and it is inferior to *t . C) 
When ( )2 2q T q>%% , the equilibrium is determined by the above-quota tariff and hence 
( ) ( )*2 2 aq T q t=%% .  
Proof: When ( ) ( )*2 2 2wq T q t q= <%% , wt binds and ( ) ( )2 2wt Tπ π= % , but 
( ) ( )* *2 2q T q t><%%  as *wt t
<
>= .  This may occur when both wt  and at  are high and w at t<  
or when w at t−  is positive, but not large enough to warrant sales at or beyond 2q . 
Clearly, ( ) ( )* * *2 2 2,wt t q T q t q= = <%%  is the best possible binding within-quota tariff 
as shown by (3). When ( )2 2q T q=%% , wt  is small compared to (the possibly 
prohibitive) at  and ( ) ( )* *2 2 2 0w aq t q q t> > ≥ . If *wt t= , too little imports enter and 
consumer surplus is too low. If ( )* *2 2q q t=  and *wt t< , too little rent-shifting is 
done as ( ) ( )*2 2 2,wt q tπ π> . Finally, when ( ) ( )*2 2 2aq T q t q= >%% , the profit of the 
foreign firm can be written as ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 2 2a w aT A q q T t q T t t qπ = − − − − −% % %% % . 
The last component is an avoidable fixed cost or fixed rent since w at t
>
< . To insure 
that the foreign firm does not produce less than ( )2q T%% , given that the domestic firm 
produces ( )*1 aq t , it must be that:  
( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( )
2 2
* *
2 1 2 2 2 1max , ; ;a w w aq q
T P q t q t q t q q tπ π
≤
 ≥ − ≡ %  .  QED 
Case B) is most common for primary and processed agricultural products (Tangerman, 
1996). In fact, many TRQ studies assume that competitive foreign firms face a TRQ 
such that 0 w at t≤ < , with at  high enough to be prohibitive. The implication is that 
foreign firms are allowed to earn rents from the policy and therefore the tariff qt  that 
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solves ( )*2 2q t q=  would be a superior instrument welfare-wise to TRQs structured 
such that w q at t t< < . Above-quota sales by the foreign firm can only be observed if 
at is sufficiently low. As such, ( )2 2q T q>%%  can be observed when w at t≤ and at  is 
low enough to permit ( ) ( )* *2 2 2w aq t q t q≥ > , but this implies giving up rents to the 
foreign firm. Alternatively, ( )2 2q T q>%%  can be consistent with w at t>  provided at  is 
small enough to support ( ) ( ) ( )*2 2 2 2,w wT t q t qπ π> ∀ ≤% , where ( )2 wtπ  is the 
unconstrained profit of the foreign firm under a tariff wt , or ( ) ( ) ( )*2 2 2 2 2, ,w wT t q q t qπ π> ∀ >% , where ( )2 2,wt qπ  is the foreign firm’s 
constrained profit level. Allowing for w at t>  creates additional rent-shifting 
possibilities because in addition to the standard rent-shifting, achieved by setting 
*
at t= , market access can be sold through { }2,wt q . In what follows, we explore the 
rent-shifting possibilities and equilibrium implications of setting the within-quota 
tariff wt at a higher level than the above-quota tariff at  and by assuming that the latter 
is set at *t . As such, we first present the TRQ as a device to sell domestic market 
access. 
 
Lemma 2: To sell market access to the foreign firm with a TRQ such that *w at t t> = , 
wt and 2q must be set such that: 1) ( )*2 2aq t q> ; 2) ( ) ( )2 2 0a w at q t tπ − − ≥ ; and 3) 
( )( )*2 1;w at q tπ ( )( ){ } ( ) ( )
2 2
*
1 2 2 2 2max a w a w aq q
P q t q t q t q t tπ
≤
 ≡ + − ≤ − −  . 
 
Proof: To extract all of the rent under the TRQ with ( ) ( )* *2 2q T q t=%% , it must be that  
( )2 0Tπ =% , which requires ( )*2 2aq t q> , ( ) ( )2 2 0a w at q t tπ − − = . The term 
( )2 w aq t t−  is the price paid by the foreign firm for having market access. Naturally, 
if the foreign firm is allowed to retain some rents, then ( ) ( )2 2 0a w at q t tπ − − > . It 
must also be that, provided firm 1 produces at its Nash equilibrium level of output, 
firm 2 not be tempted to deviate by producing 2 2(0, ]q q∈ . Its profit from such a 
deviation must be weakly negative if all rents are to be extracted or else equal to the 
level of rents it is allowed to retain under the TRQ. This motivates the third condition.   
QED 
 
 
 B. Larue, H. Lapan, J. Gervais 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 219 
 
The lemma indicates that the pair { }2, ;w at q t  set to achieve a given revenue target 
must be incentive-compatible to force the foreign firm to produce at the desired level 
of output ( ) ( )* *2 2q T q t=%% .  
 
Proposition 1: If * / 3w at t t A> = = and the government wishes to extract all of the 
rents from the foreign firm, then : A) it can use pairs { }2,wt q  that satisfy: 
5 / 9wt A≥ , ( ) ( )* * 22 2 / 81wt t q t Aπ− = =  ; B) there is a discontinuity in the 
reaction function of the foreign firm that leads to another equilibrium  at 
( ) ( )1 2, / 2,0q q A= .   
 
Proof: At ( ) ( )* * *2 2,at t q T q t= =%% , ( ) ( ) ( )* *2 2 2wT t t t qπ π= − −% . Given that 
( )2 0Tπ =%  if all the rents are to be extracted and the price of access to the domestic 
market maximized, then ( ) ( )* * 22 2 / 81wt t q t Aπ− = = . This defines a specific 
relation for { }2,wt q . However, the latter must be incentive-compatible and hence in 
production the foreign firm must not wish to deviate from ( )*2 2 wq q t= . From lemma 
2, it follows that ( ){ }
2
*
1 2
0
5 0
9w wq
AP q q t t
=
 + − = − ≤   , and hence 5 / 9wt A≥ . When 
the latter holds with equality, we have an upper bound for 2q , and hence 2 / 18q A≤ . 
Figure 1 illustrates the { }2,wt q  pairs that are feasible when 10A = . This proves part 
A). From (1), if the foreign firm produces at ( ) ( )* *2 2 / 9q T q t A= =%%  and the 
domestic firm at ( )* *1 4 / 9q t A=  then the foreign firm’s reaction function ( )*2 1,R q t  
must be equal to the domestic firm’s reaction function ( )1 2R q . This is clearly a Nash 
equilibrium, and it is depicted by point A in figure 2. Because the foreign firm would 
incur losses if it was to produce ( )( )* *2 20,q q t∈ , there is a jump in its reaction 
function, as shown in figure 2. Given that 2 0q =  also generates the maximum 
attainable profit 2 0π =  when the triplet { }2, ,w at q t  is set to extract all of the rents 
from the foreign firm and that the domestic firm’s best response would be the 
monopoly output 1 / 2
Mq A= , it follows that point B in figure 2 is also a Nash 
equilibrium.   QED 
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Corollary 1: The total rent–extracting TRQ welfare-dominates the domestic price–
equivalent strategic tariff.   
The TRQ and tariff induce firms to produce the same levels of output, thus yielding 
the same domestic price. The TRQ is a better instrument welfare-wise because it 
allows the government to extract all of the rents from the foreign firm, which it cannot 
do with the tariff. As a result, the TRQ enables the government to achieve a higher 
level of welfare than does the strategic tariff. The Nash TRQ equilibrium without 
foreign sales (point B in figure 2) is not attractive, because it is less competitive. One 
way to insure that it does not emerge is to set the TRQ in such a way as to let the 
foreign firm enjoy some rent. The above analysis naturally extends to cases for which 
the zero foreign rent target is replaced by a small positive amount: ( ) ( )*2 20 T tπ π< <% .  
Watery TRQ Liberal ization 
s argued previously, it is usually assumed that countries using TRQs rely on 
very high above-quota tariffs, low within-quota tariffs and tight minimum 
access commitments. Under perfect competition and the small-country assumption, 
such a policy is obviously less efficient than free trade and also less efficient than a 
tariff providing the same market access because of the rent captured by foreign firms. 
Accordingly, one might wonder why countries deliberately choose such a policy. The 
most common argument is that countries wish to mimic and preserve the quota 
equilibrium observed before TRQs replaced import quotas. Having much “water” in 
the above-quota tariff implies that small tariff reductions will not have any impact on 
the quota-like equilibrium if the quota of the TRQ remains unchanged. The Korean 
and Canadian above-quota tariff rates shown in table 1 are extremely high, but trade 
liberalization may still prove effective provided enlargements in the quota are 
negotiated. In contrast, in our imperfectly competitive setting, the status quo can be 
preserved even when 2q  increases. 
 
Corollary 2: Starting with a high within-quota tariff wt  and a low quota 2q , 
reductions in wt  and increases in 2q , holding at  constant at 
*t , can support the TRQ 
equilibrium that extracts all the rents from the foreign firm, as long as the changes 
remain consistent with the incentive-compatibility constraints. 
A 
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The above follows directly from proposition 1, as one of the incentive-compatibility 
constraints can be rearranged as 
2
*
281
w
At t
q
= + . Clearly, a decrease in wt  and an 
increase in 2q , such that 
2
2
2 281
wt A
q q
∂ −=∂ , are consistent with zero foreign rents as long 
as 5 / 9wt A≥ . When wt  falls below that threshold, the government cannot get all of 
the rents from the foreign firm. 
The First-Best TRQ 
s shown above, the ability to shift all of the rent of the foreign firm improves the 
welfare of the importing country. However, the TRQ described in proposition 1 
does not achieve a first-best solution because it does not incite domestic and foreign 
firms to produce enough. This is so because we had constrained the above-quota tariff 
to be equal to the strategic tariff. We will show that welfare can be increased further 
through the appropriate setting of the above-quota tariff. 
 
Proposition 2: Starting at the Nash equilibrium involving strictly positive outputs for 
both firms at *at t= so that the pair ( )2,wt q  is incentive-compatible,3 a reduction in 
the above-quota tariff at  allows the policy-active country to increase the rent by 
adjusting ( )2,wt q  as long as the incentive-compatibility constraints are respected. As 
a result, consumer surplus increases, the profit of the domestic firm decreases and 
overall welfare increases. Given that unit costs are identical and normalized at zero, 
the welfare-maximizing TRQ forces the exit of the domestic firm and entails selling a 
subsidy to the foreign firm. 
 
Proof: The reduction in at  all else equal increases the profit of the foreign firm, 
which can be shifted by the government by adjusting the pair ( )2,wt q  in such a way 
as to maintain the incentive-compatibility restrictions. Naturally, the profit of the 
domestic firm falls when at  is reduced. Given our assumptions regarding demand and 
the unit costs of firms, the optimal domestic price is zero and the optimal quantity sold 
to consumers must be A. This requires an import tax/subsidy of at A= − , which 
induces the pair of outputs ( )1 20,q q T A= =%% . To extract all the foreign rents, an entry 
fee of 2A  must be levied because ( )( ) ( )( )2 2 2 2 2 0w apq T t q t q T qπ = − − − =% %% %  implies 
( ) 22wt A q A+ = . To insure that there is no solution in the domain [ ]2 20,q q∈ , given 
A 
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1 0q =  requires ( )
2
2
2 0
0w w
q
A t t A
q
π
=
∂ = − ≤ → ≥∂ . Hence, the first-best solution can 
be supported by { }, ,w at q t  with ,wt A≥  
2
,
2w
A Aq
t A
= <+  at A= − .   QED 
The best TRQ welfare-dominates the best rent-shifting tariff, but it forces the exit of 
the domestic firm, unlike the best rent-shifting tariff, which increases the profit of the 
domestic firm at the expense of the foreign firm. As a result, governments would 
probably try to achieve the first-best solution through different instruments like price 
controls or a subsidy to domestic production. 
Negotiations on a Subset of Instruments 
he liberalization of TRQs can be a complex exercise because progress need not 
be achieved evenly across instruments. Negotiations over a given instrument may 
prove tedious, but progress on two instruments may prove sufficient to induce 
liberalisation in the third one given that the instruments are linked. The following 
proposition derives conditions under which progress on two of the three policy 
instruments is sufficient to induce changes in the third one. 
Proposition 3: Starting at *w at t t> =  and 2 2q q>  , increases in 2q  and decreases in 
wt  large enough to make ( ) ( )* *2 2wt t t qπ − −  negative will induce the rent-shifting 
government to lower at  below 
*t . 
Proof: If ( ) ( )*2 2 0w at t t qπ − − < , the price for market access is too high, but if the 
foreign firm is to sell in excess of 2q , then it must be that at  will be reduced to insure 
that the TRQ is incentive-compatible.   QED 
Conclusion 
ariff-rate quotas (TRQs) have replaced quotas at the end of the Uruguay Round 
of multilateral negotiations, but little is known about how they should be set. We 
start our analysis by assuming that a single domestic firm competes at home against a 
single foreign firm. It is well known that in this setting an import tariff can be used 
strategically by the home government to shift rent from the foreign firm. We show that 
the TRQ can be a more potent instrument by extracting all of the rents that a foreign 
firm derives under the strategic tariff. There are many pairs of within-quota tariffs and 
quotas that are incentive-compatible and hence capable of supporting the total  
 
T
T
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rent–extracting TRQ. The implication is that simultaneous reductions in the within-
quota tariff and the enlargement of the quota, holding the above-quota tariff constant, 
need not have any liberalizing effect. The first-best TRQ entails selling a subsidy to 
the foreign firm and forcing the exit of the domestic firm. 
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Figure 1  The within-tariff and quota pairs supporting total rent extraction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Reaction functions of the TRQ-constrained foreign firm and the 
unconstrained domestic firm. 
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Endnotes  
                                                     
1. Retaliation or tariff war has been considered by Johnson (1951), Kennan and 
Riezman (1988) and Syropoulos (1994), among others.    
 
2. Of course, if one or more of our assumptions do not hold, the policy prescription is 
likely to change. It is assumed that the government is completely informed about 
the technologies used by the firms and their behaviour.  Maggi (1996) and Creane 
and Miyagiwa (2008) have relaxed these assumptions.     
 
3. Thus we rule out the other pure-strategy Nash equilibrium ( ) ( )1 2, / 2,0q q A= . 
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